The DSS signature algorithm requires the signer to generate a new random number with every signature. We show that if random numbers for DSS are generated using a linear congruential pseudorandom number generator LCG then the secret key can be quickly recovered after seeing a few signatures. This illustrates the high vulnerability of the DSS to weaknesses in the underlying random number generation process. It also con rms, that a sequence produced by LCG is not only predictable as has been known before, but should be used with extreme caution even within cryptographic applications that would appear to protect this sequence. The attack we present applies to truncated linear congruential generators as well, and can be extended to any pseudo random generator that can be described via modular linear equations.
Introduction
Randomness is a key ingredient for cryptography. Random bits are necessary not only for generating cryptographic keys, but are also often an integral part of steps of cryptographic algorithms. Examples are the DSS signature algorithm 16 which requires the choice of a new random number every time a new signature is generated, and CBC encryption, which requires the generation of a new random IV each time a new message is encrypted. In fact, any secure, stateless encryption scheme must beprobabilistic, requiring new randomness for each encryption 8 . In some cases, the random numbers chosen may h a v e t o b e k ept secret as for DSS, where the leakage of one such random number compromises the secret key, whereas for other cases they can be made public as in CBC encryption, where the IV may be sent in the clear.
In practice, the random bits will be generated by a pseudo random number generation process. For example, the DSS description 16 explicitly allows either using random or pseudo-random numbers. When this is done, the security of the scheme of course depends in a crucial way on the quality of the random bits produced by the generator. Thus, an evaluation of the overall security of a cryptographic algorithm should consider and take i n to account the choice of the pseudorandom generator.
It has been well accepted that a good notion of pseudorandomness for cryptographic purposes is unpredictability 18, 20, 3, 7 : given an initial sequence produced by a pseudo-random number generator on an unknown seed, it is hard to predict with better probability than guessing at random, the next bit in the sequence output by the generator. Such generators can beconstructed based on number-theoretic assumptions, but are computationally costly. Alternatively, one could build a generator out of DES which w ould be unpredictable assuming DES behaves like a pseudorandom function, but in some contexts this may be deemed costly too, or we might not want to make such a strong assumption. Since using a weaker generator does not necessarily mean the resulting cryptographic algorithm is insecure, in practice one usually uses some weak but fast generator.
The intent of our paper is to illustrate the extreme care with which one should choose a pseudo random number generator to use within a particular cryptographic algorithm. Speci cally, we consider a concrete algorithm, the Digital Signature Standard 16 , and a concrete pseudo random number generator, the linear congruential generator LCG or truncated linear congruential pseudo random generator. We then show that if a LCG or truncated LCG is used to produce the pseudo random choices called for in DSS, then DSS becomes completely breakable.
We remark that the Standard 16 recommends the use of a pseudo-random generator based on SHA-1 or DES. The attack we describe does not say a n ything about the use of DSS with such generators, but it does illustrates the high vulnerability of the DSS to the underlying random number generation process.
We remark that LCGs are known to bepredictable if part of the pseudo-random sequence is made public see section 1.2 for details. However in DSS none of the pseudo-random numbers used is ever revealed, and thus predictability does not imply insecurity here.
Let us now look at all this more closely.
Pseudorandom numbers in DSS
Recall that the DSS has public parameters p; q; g where p; q are primes, of 512 bits and 160 bits respectively, and g is a generator of an order q subgroup of Z p . The signer has a public key y = g x where x 2 Z q . To sign a message m 2 Z q , the signer picks at random a numberk2 f 1 ; : : : ; q , 1 g and computes a signature r; s , where r = g k mod p m o d q and s = xr + mk ,1 mod q.
Here the nonce" k is chosen at random, anew for each message. In practice, a sequence of nonces will be produced by a generator G which, given some initial seed k 0 , produces a sequence of values k 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; k i will be the nonce for the i-th signature. The adversary cryptanalyst sees the public key y, and triples m i ; r i ; s i where r i ; s i is a signature of m i . Notice that the secrecy of the nonces is crucial. If ever a single nonce k i is revealed to the adversary, then the latter can recover the secret key x, because x = s i k i , m i r ,1 i mod q. However, the nonces appear to bevery well protected, making it hard to exploit any such weakness. The cryptanalyst only sees r i = g k i mod p m o d q from which he cannot recover k i short of computing discrete logarithms, and in fact not even then, due to the second mod operation. So even if G is a predictable generator, meaning, say, that given k 1 ; k 2 w e can nd k 3 , there is no a priori reason to think DSS is vulnerable with this generator, because how can the cryptanalyst ever get to know k 1 ; k 2 anyway?
This might encourage a user to think that even a weak predictable generator is OK for DSS. This view would bewrong. We indicate that in fact DSS is vulnerable, because without a su ciently good pseudorandom number generation process, the masking" of the nonces provided by the algorithm is not su cient to protect the nonces, even though recovering them seems a priori to require solving the discrete logarithm problem. In fact we prove a quite general lemma showing why this masking is essentially ine ective for pretty m uch any pseudorandom generator, and show speci cally how to recover the keys when the generator is an LCG or truncated LCG. Thus one should not succumb to the temptation of using a weak generator for DSS.
Linear congruential generators
Recall that linear congruential generators are pseudo-random number generators based on a linear recurrence X n+1 = aX n +b mod M where a, b and M are parameters initially chosen at random and then xed, and the seed is the initial value X 0 . The advantage of linear congruential generators is that they are fast, and it has been shown 11 that they have good statistical properties for appropriate choices of the parameters a; b; M.
On the other hand, their unpredictability properties are known to be quite weak. Clearly they are predictable in their simplest form: if the parameters a, b and M are known, given X 0 all the other X n can beeasily computed. Plumstead Boyar 17 shows that even if the parameters a; b; M are unknown the sequence of numbers produced by a linear congruential generator is still predictable given some of the X i . Truncated LCG were suggested by K n uth 12 as a possible way to make a linear congruential generator secure. However these generators have also been shown to be predictable 5, 9, 19 as have more general congruential generators 4, 13 .
However, as indicated above, this predictability d o e s not directly mean a cryptographic algorithm using the generator is breakable, since it is possible none of the bits of the random numbers used by the algorithm are ever made public. DSS is was a case in point.
Cryptanalysis of DSS with LCG
DSS with LCG. We consider what happens when the nonces in DSS are generated using an LCG with known parameters a; b; M and hidden seed k 0 . The predictability of the generator does not a priori appear to beaproblem, due to the masking provided by the algorithm as indicated above. However, given just three valid signatures, we show h o w to recover the secret key. Uniqueness Lemma. We begin with a general lemma which indicates why the above intuition that the DSS protects the nonces may befalse. The lemma called the Uniqueness Lemma says that as long as the nonces are pseudorandomly generated then, even if we ignore the relations r i = g k i mod p m o d q , the DSS signature equations s i k i ,r i x = m i uniquely determine the secret key with high probability. This means the cryptanalyst can e ectively ignore the masking that is supposed to protect the nonces. This is true for any pseudorandom generation process, even a cryptographically strong one, using an unpredictable generator. This lemma tells us we can concentrate on the signature equations. Solving the equations. We begin the cryptanalysis of DSS with LCG by combining the DSS signature equations" with the LCG generation equations to get a system of equations. In the process we ignore the r i = g k i mod p m o d q relations, invoking the Uniqueness Lemma to say that solving the signature equations su ces to nd the secret key. However, this system is not trivial to solve because it is a system of simultaneous modular equations in di erent moduli. Techniques like Gaussian elimination fail. Instead we turn to lattice reduction. We show how to use Babai's closest vector approximation algorithm to solve such a system. The main di culty here is dealing with the fact that this algorithm only returns not very good approximations to the closest vector. We then extend this to the case of the truncated LCG.
Other results, discussion, and implications
We extend our techniques to provide a general algorithm for solving a system of simultaneous linear modular equations in di erent moduli. Another way of doing this, when the number of equations is constant, is to reduce the problem to integer programming in constant dimension and apply the algorithms of 14, 10 . Our alternative solution seems simpler and more direct. In many cryptographic algorithms, the random numbers used are processed in a way that the public information gives little information about the original numbers. This is the case for the nonces in DSS. In such a setting, it may be reasonable to think that weak random number generators can su ce: even predictable generators could be ne because not enough information about the random numbers is revealed to make predictability even come into play. We are indicating this may not always be true: the quality of random bits matters even when the only thing an adversary sees is the result of a one-way functions on these bits.
A common pseudo-random number generator that comes standard with various operating systems is a linear congruential generator with modulus 2
32
. It is plausible that there are DSA implementations available where the k values are formed by concatenating 5 consecutive outputs from such a generator. Our attack easily extends to this case.
Preliminaries

The Digital Signature Standard
The Digital Signature Standard DSS, see 16 is an ElGamal-like 6 digital signature algorithm based on the hardness of computing the discrete logarithm in some nite elds. The scheme. The scheme uses the following parameters: a prime numberp,aprime numberq which divides p,1 and an element g 2 Z p of order q. Chosen as g = h p,1=q where h is a generator of the cyclic group Z p . These parameters may becommon to all users of the signature scheme and we will consider them as xed in the rest of the paper. The standard asks that 2 . We let G = f g : 2 Z q g denote the subgroup generated by g. Note it has prime order, and that the exponents are from a eld, namely Z q .
The secret key of a user is a random integer x in the range f0; : : : ; q , 1 g , and the corresponding public key is y = g x mod p. DSA the Digital Signature Algorithm that underlies the standard can be used to sign any message m 2 Z q , as follows. The signer generates a random number k 2 f1; : : : ; q , 1 We will make use of this relation in our attack on the DSS.
Hashing. The 160-bit message" m above is not the actual text one wants to sign, but rather the hash of it, under a strong, collision resistant cryptographic hash function H. Speci cally, if m is the actual text to be signed, the standard sets H = SHA-1, the Secure Hash Algorithm of 15 . The hashing serves two purposes. The rst is to enable one to sign messages of length longer than 160 bits. Second, it randomizes" the message to prevent any possible attacks based on the algebraic structure of the scheme. Accordingly, following 2 , we treat the hash function as a random oracle.
We stress that we are considering attacks. In this context, treating H as a random oracle only strengthens our results. If the scheme is breakable when H is a random oracle, we should de nitely consider it insecure, because a random oracle is the best" possible hash function! Our attack on the DSS algorithm does not involve the hash function H other than to assume it random. Therefore we will assume that the messages are already integers in the range f0; : : : ; q , 1 g and that they are randomly distributed. Secrecy of the nonce. Recall that for every signature, the signer generates a new, random nonce k. An important feature drawback! of the DSS is that the security relies on the secrecy of the nonces. If any nonce k ever becomes revealed, at any time, even long after the signature r; s w as generated, then given the nonce and the signature one can immediately recover the secret key x, via x = sk , mr ,1 mod q. This is a key point in our attack.
Pseudo-Random NumberGenerators
Each time DSA is used to digitally sign a message m, a nonce k is needed. Ideally k should be a truly random number. In practice the nonces k are pseudo-random numbers produced by a pseudo-random number generator.
A pseudo-random number generator is a program G that on input a seed , generates a seemingly random sequence of numbers G = k 1 ; k 2 ; : : : .
The DSS algorithm can be used in conjunction with a pseudo-random number generator as follows. On input a secret key x, a seed to the generator, and a sequence of messages m 1 ; : : : ; m n , run G to generate a sequence of pseudo-random numbers k 1 ; : : : ; k n and run DSA on input x; m i ; k i for all i = 1 ; : : : ; n .
The pseudo-random number generators we consider in this paper are all variants of the linear congruential generator. Linear Congruential Generators. A linear congruential generator LCG is parameterized by a modulus M and two numbers a; b 2 Z M . The seed to G is just a number =k 0 2Z M . On input k 0 , the generator produces a sequence of numbers, Gk 0 = k 1 ; k 2 ; : : : de ned by the linear recurrence k i+1 = ak i + b mod M. The values k i can be directly used by DSA as random nonces to sign the messages. In which case they are treated modulo q. We assume that with high probability a k i value will not be 0. 
The attack
We look at the security o f the DSS when the nonces are generated using a LCG with parameters a; b; M. Later we will extend this to truncated LCGs.
Overview
Our attack on DSS exploits the relationship sk , rx=mmod q holding for any digital signature r; s = DSAx; k; m produced by the DSA algorithm. The idea is this. Assume that we receive two messages m 1 and m 2 together with their digital signatures r 1 ; s 1 = DSAx; k 1 ; m 1 and r 2 ; s 2 = DSAx; k 2 ; m 2 . We know that s 1 k 1 , r 1 x = m 1 mod q and s 2 k 2 , r 2 x = m 2 mod q. The cryptanalyst knows m 1 ; r 1 ; s 1 ; m 2 ; r 2 ; s 2 . He also knows the public parameters p; q; g of the DSS and the public key y = g x of the signer. What is hidden from him is the secret key x of the signer, and also the nonces k 1 ; k 2 which the signer used to produce the signatures.
At this point, the cryptanalyst is not expected to have any way of determining any of the unknowns short of computing discrete logarithms. However, now suppose we know that a linear congruential generator with parameters a; b; M has been used to produce the nonces. We assume the cryptanalyst knows the parameters a; b; M de ning the LCG. They were chosen at random, but then made public. What is unknown to the cryptanalyst is the seed k 0 used by the signer to start the LCG. Now, we can combine the two signature equations above with the linear congruential equation k 2 = ak 1 + b mod M. These three equations together yield a system of three modular equations in three unknowns: Our approach is to try to solve these equations. Note it is a system of simultaneous modular linear equations in di erent moduli.
This approach at once raises two questions. One, of course, is how to solve such a system. But the other question may need to be addressed rst. Namely, e v en if we solve it, how d o w e know the solutions we get are the desired ones? That is, there may be many di erent solutions, and nding a solution to the system 1 does not necessarily imply that we found the right one. Meaning the one corresponding to the secret key x.
This worry arises from a feature of this approach that we should highlight. We are not using all available information. We propose to ignore the fact that r i = g k i mod p m o d q . W e will simply try to solve the equations, and see what we get. When we are ignoring what may seem a fundamental relation of the DSS signatures, it is not clear why solving the equations will bring us the right solutions: our system of equations might be under-determined.
We will answer this question in Section 3.2, showing that even disregarding the non-linear relationships r 1 = g k 1 mod p m o d q and r 2 = g k 2 mod p m o d q , the solution to our equations is uniquely determined in most of the cases. Then we can turn to the problem of solving a system of modular linear equations.
If the moduli are the same, M = q, the equations can be easily solved by linear algebra. So, it is insecure to use q as the modulus in the LCG. However, if the modulus M is chosen randomly and independently from q, as we assume, one might still imagine that the equation k 2 = ak 1 + b mod M does not help in nding the secret key because it is in a di erent modulus and cannot be easily combined with the other equations. In other words, we are faced with solving a system of simultaneous modular linear equations in di erent moduli. We address this via lattice reduction techniques in Section 3.3.
In later sections we extend the attack to truncated LCGs and also present a general method for solving systems of simultaneous linear modular equations in di erent modulii.
The Uniqueness Lemma
In this section we prove that when DSS is used with a pseudo-random numbergenerator, a few signatures are usually enough for the linear equations s i k i , r i x = m i to uniquely determine the secret key x, disregarding that it must bealso that r i = g k i mod p mod q. This answers the rst question that we posed in section 3.1 and opens up the possibility o f breaking DSS by solving a system of linear equations.
We stress this is true for any generator, not just LCG. The generator might be very strong eg. cryptographically strong or very weak, it does not matter. The number of signatures needed depends only on the length of the seed of the generator, growing linearly with this.
The statement we make is a probabilistic one: with high probability the system of equations obtained by using DSS with a linear congruential generator has a unique solution. The probability is taken over the choices of the messages to besigned only. As discussed in Section 2, these are hashes of the real messages under some strong" one-way hash function, and so considering them random is natural, especially from an attack point of view. In other words, no matter how w e had chosen x and , once they are xed, if the messages m i are randomly chosen the secret key x is uniquely determined with high probability.
Before stating the lemma we need some de nitions. Fix a secret key x 2 Z q of the DSS. Let G be some generator not necessarily LCG and let M be the total number of seeds that G can take. So we will think of a seed of G as being in Z M . Now x a seed 2 Z M of the generator G. Let Now since the messages are chosen independently at random, the probability that s i k 0 i , r i x 0 = m i for all i = 1 ; : : : ; n , is q ,n . Recall this is for xed x 0 2 Z q x 0 6 = x and 0 2 Z M . The probability that there exists x 0 ; 0 which is a false solution is thus, by the union bound, at most q,1M q ,n M q 1 , n .F or the claim about the expected numberof false solutions, use linearity of expectation instead of the union bound.
Recall these results are true for any pseudo-random number generator G. That is even if G is cryptographically strong, with high probability there will be only one secret key x and seed such that the equations r i x 0 + s i k 0 i = m i are simultaneously satis ed. Clearly if G is cryptographically strong it will be hard to recover these x and from the signatures r i ; s i and messages m i only.
But for the LCG it can be done.
Solving the equations
Lemma 3.1 shows that even if M 6 = q, if M and q have the same size i.e., 1=2 M = q 2, the system of equations 1 will usually have only a few solutions. Therefore, if we can solve the system of equations we can also retrieve the secret key. Solving via integer programming. We remark that systems of linear equations in di erent moduli can be rewritten as integer programming problems by i n troducing a new variable for each equation. Since we h a v e a constant n umber of equations, they can thus be solved using polynomial time algorithms for integer programming in constant dimensions as given in 14, 10 . However these algorithms are relatively complex and slow. Instead, we w e w ant to solve more directly and simply. We now present a simple lattice based algorithm that solves our system using a nearest lattice vector approximation algorithm as a subroutine.
The nearest lattice vector problem. Let B = fb 1 ; : : : ; b n g be a nite set of vectors in R n .
The lattice generated by B is the set of all integer combinations of the vectors in B and is denoted by LB. Given B and a vector x 2 R n not in LB, the nearest lattice vector problem asks for a lattice vectors w 2 LB such that kw , xk = min v2LB kv , xk. In 1 , Babai gave a simple polynomial time algorithm to nd an approximate solution to the nearest lattice vector problem:
given the basis B and the target vector x, Babai's algorithm returns a lattice vector w such that kw , xk c min v2LB kv , xk, where c = 2 n=2 is an approximation factor depending only on the dimension of the lattice. The lattice. In order to solve the system of equations 1, we set up the following lattice. Let The number of possible x 0 ; k 0 1 ; k 0 2 to start with, to be sure of nding a solution to the system is polynomial in lg q and lg M, s o w e can try all of them in polynomial time.
Once we h a v e found a solution x 0 ; k 0 1 ; k 0 2 to the equations 1, we can check that we actually found the secret key x by computing g x 0 mod p and comparing it with the public key y. If g x 0 mod p 6 = y, then x 6 = x 0 and we did not found the solution that we w anted. In this case we can use the method just described to nd a solution to the equations 1 in the range 0 x x 0 or x 0 x q . Since by Lemma 3.1 the total numberofxsuch that system 1 has solution is less then 2 on the average, with high probability w e will nd the right x after one or two steps.
This completes the description of the attack to DSS when used with linear congruential generators.
Solving Simultaneous Modular Equations
The technique described in section 3.3 can begeneralized to work on arbitrary systems of linear equations in di erent moduli. These kind of systems arises in the cryptanalysis of DSS when used with more sophisticated pseudo-random number generators, such as truncated linear congruential generators.
In this section we state the problem of solving a system of linear equations in di erent moduli in its full generality and give an algorithm to nd a solution to such a systems. When the numberof equations and variables is xed, the running time of the algorithm is polynomial in the logarithms of all numbers involved in the description of the equations.
We consider the problem of nding small" solutions to a system of modular linear equations in di erent moduli. More precisely, let U 1 ; : : : ; U n be positive integers and let V U be the set of vectors fx 2 Z n j 8 i:jx i j U i g . Let also A = fa i;j g beanmninteger matrix, andb andM be twovectors in Z m . We w ant to nd an integer vectorx 2 V U such that A x =b modM, i.e., jx i j U i for all i = 1 ; : : : ; n and the following modular equations are simultaneously satis ed Proof: Clearly it is su cient to show that for all i and for all x 2 f,U i + 1 ; : : : ; U i , 1 g , there is some y in D i such that jx , yj U i , j y j = c p n . Since the set D i is symmetric with respect to the origin, we can assume without loss of generality that x 0. Now, notice that the sequence y j = 1 , 1 , 1= j U i is increasing. Moreover y 0 = 0 and y lg U i U i , 1 . Therefore there exists a j 2 f 0 ; : : : ; lg U i , 1g such that y j x y j +1 . Now, let x 0 = y j + U1 , 1= j =c p n. If Theorem 4.4 There is an algorithm which on input m modular equations in n variables and n positive i n tegers U 1 ; : : : ; U n , nds a solution x 1 ; : : : ; x n to the equations such that jx i j U i for all i = 1 ; : : : ; n and for any xed n and m the running time of the algorithm is polynomial in the sizes of the numbers.
In the above theorem the interval in which the variables x i ranges need not be centered around the origin, as if we w ant L i x i U i w e can simply substitute x i , U i + L i =2 for x i and obtain an equivalent linear system to be solved in the interval jx i j U i , L i =2. Corollary 4.5 There is an algorithm which on input m modular equations in n variables and positive i n tegers L 1 ; U 1 ; : : : ; L n ; U n , nds a solution x 1 ; : : : ; x n to the equations such that L i x i U i for all i = 1 ; : : : ; n and for any xed n and m the running time of the algorithm is polynomial in the sizes of the numbers.
Other Pseudo-Random NumberGenerators
In section 3.1 we presented an attack to DSS that involves the solution of a system of three modular equations in di erent moduli. The attack easily extends to any pseudo-random number generator expressible by modular linear equations. As an example we consider truncated linear congruential generator and generators where a long nonce is obtained by concatenating shorter random numbers. So, the entire process of computing k 1 ; k 2 ; : : : ; k n from a seed 0 can be expressed by modular linear equations 2,4 and 5 for i = 1 ; : : : ; n .
Consider now the use of DSA with a truncated linear congruential generator G of parameters M; a; b; l; h. For concreteness, we assume that half of the bits are truncated, i.e., h , l = lg M=2.
Since we want to use the numbers output by the generator as nonces in the DSA algorithm, we also assume that h , l = l g q . Consider the system of equations probability, the solution x we found is the DSA secret key.
Linear Congruential Generators with Concatenation
If the numbers i output by the pseudo-random generator are too short, the nonces k i can be obtained by concatenating several i together.
For example, a common pseudo-random numbergenerator that comes standard with various operating systems is a linear congruential generator with modulus 2
32
. The 160 bit number k required to sign with DSA can beobtained by concatenating 5 consecutive outputs from such a generator.
Our attack immediately applies to these schemes. Let i be the sequence of random numbers The attack easily generalizes to generators involving any combination of truncation and concatenation operations.
